This paper analyzes the impacts of selected trade facilitation measures on international trade flows. A gravity model is used to estimate four equations: a pooled cross-section model; a fixed-effects model; a random effects model; and a Poisson maximum likelihood estimator. The contribution of the paper is twofold. First, the analysis uses a recent data set, a panel that includes trade data from 2011 and 2012 for 72 countries. Second, to measure the impacts of trade facilitation measures, the analysis includes dummy variables for the presence of an authorized economic operator program, the existence of a single-window program in the countries in the sample, and the existence of a mutual recognition arrangement between pairs of countries in the sample. The results show that the presence of an authorized economic operator program and the existence of a single-window program will improve countries' trade performance. By contrast, the existence of a mutual recognition arrangement will not necessarily improve countries' trade performance. These results suggest that, in general, trade facilitation measures as a whole will help countries improve their trade performance.
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Introduction
Trade Facilitation is defined as the simplification, harmonization, standardization and modernization of procedures of international trade. Trade facilitation measures help countries reduce trade barriers and transaction costs, which will in turn help ensure the predictability of operations and contribute to the competitiveness of countries that engage in international trade (MACEDO; SÁ PORTO, 2011, p.162) . This is the case particularly as protectionist tariff rates have fallen, and assessing how other factors (nontariff measures as trade facilitation measures) affect trade has increasing policy relevance OTSUKI, 2005, p. 841) (CANUTO, 2013) .
Furthermore, by reducing the waste of using human and material resources with activities that often do not add equivalent value, trade facilitation also becomes a source of increases of a country's "total factor productivity" (CANUTO, 2012) .
Essentially, trade facilitation aims at harmonizing certain rules between countries to promote greater efficiency, transparency and predictability, based on norms, standards and internationally accepted practices. Thus, trade facilitation is a tool that can potentially reduce trade barriers and transaction costs, and it helps to ensure the predictability of operations, thus contributing to the competitiveness of a country (SCORZA, 2007; MACEDO, SÁ PORTO, 2011) .
Portugal-Perez and Wilson (2010) show that reforms using Trade Facilitation (TF) measures substantially improve the export performance of developing countries.
The authors set indicators for 112 countries using data for the period 2004-2007, and grouped them into two dimensions, one dimension of hard infrastructure and one of soft infrastructure. Hard infrastructure indicators refer to the physical infrastructure and measure the level of development and the quality of ports, airports, railways, and ITC (Information Technology and Communications) infrastructure. In turn, soft infrastructure indicators include transportation and border efficiency measures (such as time, cost and number of documents required for export and import procedures) as well as regulatory and business environment procedures (such as irregular payments indicators, government transparency and anti-corruption measures).
In fact, soft measures have been increasingly implemented and adopted by both developed and developing countries in recent years. One such measure is the Authorized Economic Operator (AEO). The AEO is a party involved in the international movement of goods and which is recognized on its behalf or on behalf of a national customs administration for complying with supply chain security standards. To qualify as an AEO, it is necessary that the company meet the criteria specified by the Customs of the country in question, including having appropriate records of compliance with customs requirements and a satisfactory management system of commercial records (SÁ PORTO et al., 2013, p. 64) .
Another important soft measure is the Single Window (SW). It is a single point of contact between foreign trade operators and government to fulfill the requirements for import, export and customs transit. Through the single window, all demands for information and documents made by the bodies involved in the trade are given in a coordinated and harmonized manner through a single interlocutor, preferably in a computerized system accessible over the Internet. Responses from government agencies to foreign trade operators must also occur in a coordinated manner through this system (SCORZA; MACEDO, 2013, p.38) . Additionally, another important TF measure is the Mutual Recognition Arrangement (MRA), which is an international arrangement based on an agreement by which two or more countries agree to recognize one another's conformity assessments regarding TF measures, such as the AEO.
The objective of this paper is to analyze the impacts of those selected trade facilitation measures on international trade flows. For that we used a gravity model, such as in Wilson, Mann and Otsuki (2005) and in Souza and Burnquist (2011) .
However, we used a more recent data set, a panel that included trade data from 2011 and 2012 for 72 countries. Moreover, to measure the impacts of trade facilitation measures, we included dummy variables for those three trade facilitation measures mentioned above, the Authorized Economic Operator (AEO) program, the Single Window (SW) program and the Mutual Recognition Arrangements (MRA). Those three variables were used as a proxy for trade facilitation.
The paper is structured as follows. After this brief introduction, we review in Section 2 the recent literature on trade facilitation and on the gravity model, while in Section 3 we present the model and the data used in this paper. We present our main results In section 4, and in section 5 we present our conclusions and possible further research on this subject.
Literature review
In this section we will briefly review the existing literature on trade facilitation and on the gravity model. We will start with a discussion on the definition of trade facilitation, its use and role on fostering international trade. Then we will introduce the gravity equation and evaluate the empirical models that use it to analyze impacts of regional agreements and of trade facilitation measures on international trade.
Trade facilitation
Trade facilitation is known as the set of measures that seek to simplify, harmonize, standardize, and modernize the international trade procedures. It comprises customs procedures, logistics, licensing procedures and documentation, insurance and other financial requirements that are imposed on the entry or exit of goods from countries (BEHAR et al. 2011 ) (CANUTO, 2012 .
Trade facilitation (TF) aims at harmonizing the several rules between countries in order to promote greater efficiency, transparency and predictability based on norms, standards, and internationally accepted practices. In this sense, TF is a tool that can potentially reduce barriers and transaction costs, in order to help ensure the predictability of operations and to thus contribute to the competitiveness of a country (SCORZA 2007; MACEDO, SÁ PORTO 2011).
There are several TF measures that could be used as a proxy for their effect on the national economies. One such measure is the Authorized Economic Operator (AEO) program, which is defined as a "party involved in the international movement of goods in whatever function that has been approved by or on behalf of a national customs administration as complying with WCO or equivalent supply chain security standards" (WCO 2014a, p.3). Another common TF measure is the Single Window (SW) program, which is defined as "a facility that allows parties involved in trade and transport to lodge standardized information and documents with a single entry point to fulfil all import, export, and transit-related regulatory requirements. If information is electronic, then individual data elements should only be submitted once" (UN/CEFAT,
2005, p.3).
Yet another important TF measure is the Mutual Recognition Arrangement (MRA), which is, as mentioned earlier, an international arrangement based on an agreement by which two or more countries agree to recognize one another's conformity assessments regarding TF measures. "The objective of Mutual Recognition of AEO is that one Customs administration recognizes the validation findings and AEO authorizations by the other Customs administration issued under the other programme and agrees to provide substantial, comparable and -where possible -reciprocal benefits/facilitation to the mutually recognized AEOs. This recognition is generally premised on the existence or creation of both relevant legislation and operational compatibility of both or more programmes" (WCO 2014b, p.127). 
where Xij is the dollar value of exports from country i to country j; Yi is the nominal value of country i's Gross Domestic Product (GDP); Yj is the nominal value of country j's GDP; Ni is the population of country i; Nj is the population of country j; Distij is the distance between the commercial centers of the two countries, and is used as a proxy for the trade resistance variables; Pref is a dummy variable which equals to 1 if both countries belong to a specific preferential trade area and zero otherwise; and eij is the error term. The coefficients a0 through a6 are to be estimated by the regression. "improving border management, transport and communications infrastructure services could increase global GDP by up to six times more than removing all import tariffs." (HOEKMAN and JACKSON, 2013, p.2) another for the simplification of import procedures. Their results suggest that improvements in the areas of trade facilitation, which would lead to a relative increase in simplifying indexes, can stimulate trade flows between countries.
Model and data
In this section we will present our model designed to evaluate the impacts of trade facilitation measures on international trade flows. We use a standard gravity model, such as the one in WILSON, MANN and OTSUKI (2005) estimating cross-section models, as it helps to account for different econometric and Zimbabwe. We used the same sample of countries as in Wilson, Mann and Otsuki (2005) , except that we excluded Bangladesh, Trinidad and Tobago and Taiwan, China, from our sample, since there were no trade data for these three countries in the years 2011 and 2012. The results of the four models are displayed in Table 1 . The coefficients for GDP and for distance have the expected signs and are significant for the four models, except the importer's GDP in the FE model. The coefficients for population are significant only in one case (for the FE model), but had the wrong sign (it should have been positive). Thus, GDP and distance are important to explain trade between countries in our sample of 72 countries in the 2011-2012 period. These results are similar to the ones obtained in other studies by the authors cited in section 2.
Regarding the role of the dummy variables, the adjacency dummy was significant and positive in all models (except in the FE model, in which it is not defined),
indicating that even when we control for distance, countries tend to trade more with neighboring countries. As for the language dummies, the only languages that were significant and had the right sign for the coefficient in all models were English, Spanish and Russian, indicating that, ceteris paribus, the countries in which those languages are spoken tend to trade more than the rest of the countries in the sample.
As for the regional economic integration dummies, the only blocs that were significant and had the right sign for the coefficient in all models were APEC, LAIA and SADC. This means that, ceteris paribus, countries that participate in these blocs tend to trade more than the rest of the countries in the sample. Note that the coefficients for the European Union and for Nafta (except in one model) were significant in all models but had the wrong sign (negative sign), which were unexpected results. Note also that the coefficient for Mercosur was not significant, showing that the trade within that bloc has lost relevance over time. 8 Finally, regarding the results for the trade facilitation dummies, we notice that all three variables were significant in all models but one case; however, only AEO and SW have the expected signs, whereas MRA does not. This means that, controlling for all other variables, the role of an Authorized Economic Operator program and the the role of a Single Window program is positive for world trade. That is, the presence of a AEO program and a SW program will improve a country's trade performance. By contrast, the coefficient for MRA was negative, whereas we expected a positive coefficient (the presence of a MRA was supposed to improved international trade). This shows that, ceteris paribus, the existence of a Mutual Recognition Arrangement will not improve the countries' trade performance. These results suggest that in general trade facilitation measures as a whole will help countries improve their trade performance. has not yet been fully corroborated in all countries and it is not standing ready for implementation. In any case, there is enough acknowledgement of the importance of that theme in today's trade arena and for multilateral trade liberalization, which is particularly relevant in a time where many countries are "going regional", that is, adopting regional (rather than multilateral) trade agreements.
In this paper, we analyzed the impact We found that the presence of an Authorized Economic Operator program and the existence of a Single Window program will improve countries' trade performance.
By contrast, the existence of a Mutual Recognition Arrangement will not necessarily improve the countries' trade performance. These results suggest that in general trade facilitation measures as a whole will help countries improve their trade performance.
This study can be extended in several ways. First, other variables could be included to control for the presence of other effects on trade that could be otherwise attributed to our TF variables, such as tariffs, inflation and exchange rate. Moreover, other TF measures besides ours could be included, such as the ones included in Wilson, Mann and Otsuki (2005) and in Souza and Burnquist (2011) .
